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11 Introduction
Government subsidies for R&D are intended to promote projects with high returns to
society but too little private returns to be beneﬁcial for private investors. This may be
caused by spillovers of ideas to competitors or a low appropriability rate. Especially
basic research is aﬀected by this issue. Most public R&D policies are justiﬁed by this
stylized fact. R&D subsidies are an important tool to support technology policy in OECD
countries. In 2005 roughly one third of funds for R&D are provided by the government
(EU 27: 34.7%, US: 30.4%, source: IW (2008)).
A diﬃcult problem for government agencies is, however, to identify projects which
are beneﬁcial for society but need additional funds to be executed as private returns
are too low. If an R&D project is publicly funded, there is a certain risk that private
investment is simply replaced. In economic literature this crowding out eﬀect is widely
discussed and the evidence is mixed. David, Hall, and Toole (2000) survey the empirical
literature and ﬁnd that results are dependent on the aggregation level. For a low level
of aggregation the proportion of studies reporting a crowding out eﬀect is signiﬁcantly
higher. Lichtenberg (1984, 1987) claims that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a valid control group
and in several earlier studies a selection bias led to an overestimation of the positive
eﬀect of government funded R&D. Klette, Møen, and Griliches (2000) and Lerner (1999)
argue that also political inﬂuence and distorted incentives for decision makers may lead
to subsidies for the ”wrong” R&D projects.
While the empirical literature on the impact of R&D subsidies on ﬁrms’ innovation
incentives is growing, theoretical papers are scarce. In a seminal paper, Spence (1984) an-
alyzes ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in oligopolies when spillovers are present. He shows that
without subsidies social welfare eventually decreases as the number of ﬁrms increases.
This result is driven by the interaction of three simultaneously occurring market failures.
First, as R&D expenditures are to a large extend ﬁxed costs, markets are likely to be
concentrated and thus imperfectly competitive, leading to allocative ineﬃciencies. Sec-
ond, free riding on rivals’ R&D creates an incentive problem for ﬁrms. Finally, if ﬁrms
use a similar approach to reduce costs, there is a wasteful duplication of R&D eﬀorts.
If the number of ﬁrms increases, the positive eﬀect on allocative eﬃciency gets smaller
while the negative incentive and duplication of R&D eﬀorts eﬀect is still present. Hence,
the optimal number of ﬁrms is ﬁnite.1 Spence shows that in a market with suﬃcient
spillovers it is more eﬃcient to overcome the incentive problem by subsidizing ﬁrm’s
R&D than by allowing for R&D cooperations.
Romano (1989) analyzes optimal subsidization in research markets depending on the
length of patent life, the character of innovation competition, and the extent of excess
burdens associated with the generation of funds for subsidies. He shows that if there is
a monopoly in the research market, the optimal subsidy is always positive, independent
1In fact, depending on parameter combinations this number is small.
2of the patent life and the amount of the excess burden.2 In contrast, in a competitive
research market, the optimal subsidy is zero for a ”long” patent life or a ”high” excess
burden.
Hinloopen (1997, 2000) studies how the eﬀect of R&D subsidies depends on the degree
of cooperation of ﬁrms. He introduces taxes that are used to provide ﬁrms with R&D
subsides into d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s (1988) model. He shows that this policy can
increase private R&D investments, output, and social welfare. Further, he shows that
subsidizing noncooperative R&D is more eﬀective in raising private R&D eﬀorts than
permitting RJVs or R&D cartels and in most cases also more eﬀective than permitting
RJV cartels.3
This paper addresses an additional eﬀect of subsidies. Apart from the direct funding
of these projects, government grants may serve as a signal for good investments to private
investors.
Lerner (1999) analyzes the SBIR program (initiated in 1982) that was intended to
stimulate innovation in small high tech ﬁrms. The study evaluates the performance of
ﬁrms receiving SBIR rewards in the period of 1983 to 1985. SBIR awardees grew signiﬁ-
cantly faster in terms of sales and employment compared to similar non-supported ﬁrms,
from 1985 to 1995. He attributes capital market imperfections, speciﬁcally the diﬃculty
to raise capital for uncertain R&D projects due to information asymmetries as a source
of diﬀerence in performance. The SBIR program could play an important role in certi-
fying ﬁrms’ quality and technological merits of the ﬁrms’ projects, thereby alleviating
capital market imperfections. In line with this interpretation is the importance of the
ﬁrst award compared to subsequent ones. Lerner assumes that this signal to investors is
particularly important in high tech industries where it is diﬃcult for smaller banks to
analyze risk and potential beneﬁts of research projects. Also, a recently released report
of the National Governors Association (NGA) claims that ”an SBIR award provides a
signal to angel investors that these technologies hold promise and an opportunity to
leverage their investments with another source of early-stage funding” (NGA (2008),
p.7).
A more recent empirical analysis of Meuleman and de Maeseneire (2008) conﬁrms
Lerner’s conclusion. In a study of Belgian small and medium sized ﬁrms’ access to
external ﬁnancing, they ﬁnd a positive certiﬁcation eﬀect of obtaining an R&D grant.
Furthermore, the certiﬁcation eﬀect is stronger for start-up ﬁrms. Thus, again, when
projects are diﬃcult to evaluate, as in high technology industries or new markets, the
R&D grant is more important to secure private funding.
In an interview study of ﬁrms that applied to the 1998 US Advanced Technology
Program, Feldman and Kelley (2006) ﬁnd that receipt of a government R&D subsidy
2The additional costs to generate funds for the subsidy are called ”excess burden” in Romano’s model.
3Hinloopen uses the Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) diﬀerentiation for types of R&D
cooperatives.
3increased the external funding possibilities. These private funds are important, especially
for small- and medium-sized ﬁrms.
A survey of possible underinvestment in R&D caused by capital market imperfec-
tions is given in Hall (2002). Generally, she ﬁnds that a problem for private investment
in research is that there is no capitalized value for R&D in a ﬁrm’s balance sheet. Asym-
metric information between borrowers and lenders may then cause potential lenders to
be reluctant to fund R&D due to its inherent risk, even if the borrower promised high
expected returns. Even venture capitalists, specialized in providing risky capital may fail
to provide a solution to capital constraints in R&D. First, only a small number of ﬁrms
in speciﬁc sectors receive funds. More importantly, as argued in Bhattacharya and Ritter
(1983) or Ueda (2004), the threat of expropriation may limit screening activities. If the
ﬁrm has to reveal valuable private information about the R&D projects to a private
investor to get funds, there is a certain risk that the ﬁnancier will steal the information.
Our paper is related to the theoretical literature on entrepreneurial ﬁnance.4 Repullo
and Suarez (2000) and Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembanelli (2006) emphasize the impor-
tance of informed ﬁnanciers, like venture capitalists, to reduce the monitoring or moral
hazard problem. In contrast, our model focusses on asymmetric information. Takolo and
Tanayama (2008) adapt Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1997) framework with ﬁnancial inter-
mediation in a market where ﬁrms are capital constrained to model a signaling eﬀect
of R&D subsidies. In a model with high and low quality entrepreneurs, subsidies reduce
capital costs related to the innovation projects and provide a signal to investors. Their
model diﬀers in two important ways. First, the focus is on the ﬁnance eﬀect of the sub-
sidy. A project without subsidies will never be executed in the considered equilibria.
Second, the government agency and private investors prefer the same type of projects,
namely high quality projects. In contrast, we model high and low risk projects, where
the low risk type is preferred by private investors and the high risk type is preferred by
the government agency, imposing conﬂicting interests between these two actors.
We use a signaling model to capture the problem of asymmetric information between
banks, ﬁrms, and a government agency. The agency screens R&D projects and decides on
granting a subsidy. Banks observe this signal and then give loans to ﬁrms or not. Thus,
we assume that ﬁrms ﬁrst seek public funding. However, our results are not altered if
we assume that ﬁrms ﬁrst contact private investors who make their funding decisions
contingent on the public funding decision. We solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria in two
setups. If the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between high and low risk projects,
the government agency’s signal is not very helpful for banks’ investment decision. An
equilibrium where the agency is pooling its signal for both project types is very likely.
However, if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal, it can lead to increased and
better selected private investments.
4For a recent overview of that literature, see Boadway and Keen (2006).
4The paper is organized as follows: First, the general signaling model is described.
Then, equilibria for both setups are derived. The ﬁnal section concludes, discusses limi-
tations of our model, and points out interesting topics for further research.
2 Model
To show the potential certiﬁcation character of a government subsidy, a simple signaling
model is used. As argued in Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) or Czarnitzki and Toole
(2006) ﬁrms have an incentive to apply for government grants for any project, i.e., not
only those where private returns are not suﬃcient, unless there are signiﬁcant costs of
application. Thus, all projects eligible for subsidies have to be reviewed by the agency.5
For simpliﬁcation, we assume that there are only two risk classes of projects: High and
low risk.
Basic research projects are usually more risky, as the ﬁnal result is unclear and there-
fore commercial applications are diﬃcult to foresee. The appropriability level of expen-
ditures for basic research is low (see for example Beise and Stahl (2002)). Furthermore,
these projects usually generate high spillovers to competitors. Funk (2002) shows that
spillovers from basic research are signiﬁcantly larger than from developmental research.
However, it is necessary for society that these projects are executed as they generate
foundations for further research. Thus, we assume that high risk projects are beneﬁcial
to society even though they are not privately beneﬁcial. For example, the German Fed-
eral Government justiﬁes public R&D funds where research has long time horizons, a
high economic risk and great ﬁnancial needs. It is argued that this type of research is
very likely to be beyond the possibilities of individual companies (BMBF (1993)).
Low risk projects, like improvement of already existing products, are expected to
be privately beneﬁcial for companies. Projects of this risk type generate enough private
returns to be funded by private investors. On the other hand, social beneﬁts do not
exceed investments for this type of projects. Therefore, the agency does not want to
grant subsidies for this risk type.
Agency’s capital is restricted in a way that it is costly for the agency to subsidize
projects. More formally, we assume that the social return function I(x) – which is the
agency’s objective function – of high and low risk projects is of the following type:
IH(0) = IL(0) = 0,
I0
H(x) > 1, 0 < I0
L(x) < 1,
where H and L indicate high and low risk projects respectively. Projects can be executed
with private investment only (social return I(P)), with subsidies only (I(S)), or with a
combination of private investment and subsidies (I(S+P)). We assume that the private
investment P is the same for a subsidized and non subsidized projects or in other words
5In the ﬁrst setup these are all projects, in the second only those meeting the quality requirement,
compare sections 2.1 and 2.2.
5we are not modeling crowding out eﬀects. However, if we allow the private investment to
depend on the project being subsidized or not, general results are not altered if we make
some reasonable assumptions on the diﬀerence between private funding for subsidized
and non subsidized projects.6
To model capital market imperfections, we assume that ﬁrms do not have funds on
their own to perform their R&D projects but need loans from banks to do so. Asymmetric
information in this market is modeled in the way that banks cannot distinguish high and
low risk projects. A government agency, due to more experience with similar projects
in the past, can. This assumption is in line with the empirical analysis of Lerner (1999)
and the modeling of Takolo and Tanayama (2008). Lerner shows that due to more
intensive analysis venture capitalists and government agencies perform a signiﬁcantly
better screening and thus have an improved perception of the project’s riskiness.7
The agency can use subsidies to promote projects of its interest. Moreover, and that
is the focus of the analysis, it can grant subsidies (or not) to signal project types to
private investors.8
2.1 Subsidies without Quality Signal
Firms apply for subsidies for all of their projects. Therefore, the game structure only
shows Nature’s random choice of project type. The proportion of high risk projects is α,
the proportion of low risk projects 1 − α. The agency observes for what type of project
the ﬁrm is applying and then decides on granting a subsidy (S) or not (nS). Banks
observe the agency’s decision but not the project type and decide on investing in that
project (L) or not (nL). Finally, payoﬀs are realized. The game structure is shown in
ﬁgure 1.
Both the agency and banks are assumed to be risk neutral. Expected payoﬀs are
denoted in brackets, agency’s on the left, banks’ on the right.9 Banks beliefs are λ in the
no subsidy information set and µ in the subsidy information set. As explained above,
we assume that banks prefer low risk projects. To have a non-trivial decision for banks,
we further assume that banks’ expected payoﬀs for high risk projects are negative, while
they are positive for low risk projects. If banks do not invest, their payoﬀ is zero.10 Thus,
6Arguing and calculations are in some cases simply more complex and this way of modeling does not
lead to more insights.
7Of course, the assumption that banks have no information on the project type and that agency’s
screening is perfect is for simpliﬁcation.
8The analysis focuses on the asymmetric information problem concerning the project’s risk type.
We abstract from other information or observation problems, like moral hazard for ﬁrms’ utilization of
investment.
9Banks’ payoﬀs are denoted by A, B, C, and D. Conditions on the relationship between these pa-
rameters are established on the following pages.
10Note that this formulation is equivalent to assume higher and lower payoﬀs than payoﬀs for an
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Figure 1: Game structure without quality signal.
the parameters must fulﬁll the following conditions:11
A < 0 < B; C < 0 < D.
For illustration of strategies, beliefs, and payoﬀs, assume that a ﬁrm is applying for
subsidies for a high risk project, the agency decides on giving no subsidies to the project,
and banks have the belief λ = 0.5 on the project type and therefore decide to give a
loan. Payoﬀs arising from these strategies are IH(P) for the agency and A for banks.
In the following propositions we identify for what parameter combinations perfect
Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies exist.12
Proposition 1. There is no separating equilibrium where subsidies are granted for low
risk projects and no subsidies are granted for high risk projects.
Proof. See the appendix.
This type of equilibrium would, of course, not be in the interest of the agency anyway and
it is pretty intuitive that these strategies can never be an equilibrium. As the strategies
clearly indicate the type of project to banks, they will give loans only to their preferred
projects, i.e., the low risk ones. Additionally, the agency grants subsidies to the project
11The investment P is already included in banks’ expected payoﬀs.
12We restrict attention to pure strategies for the agency because in that way the agency can deﬁne a
strict policy and the subsidy decision is not taken randomly. For banks, the decision to give loans or not
is based on the expected proﬁt and is therefore – except for the case of equality of both decisions – a
pure strategy in equilibrium. We do also only consider equilibria where the equilibrium strategy makes
the player strictly better oﬀ than the deviation strategy. However, a change of this assumption would
not alter our results.
7type it does not prefer. Therefore, the agency has a clear incentive to deviate from this
strategy since the agency grants subsidies only to its not preferred projects and only
these projects receive private funding.
The agency’s most preferred equilibrium would be one where subsidies are granted
to high risk projects only. However, as the following proposition shows, this equilibrium
only exists under very strict assumptions to the social return function.
Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium where subsidies are granted for high risk
projects and no subsidies are granted for low risk projects exists only if
IH(P) < −S + IH(S). (2.1)
In this equilibrium banks give no loans to subsidized projects and give loans to the non
subsidized ones.
Proof. See the appendix.
As before, the signal perfectly reveals project types to banks with the same implication
for banks’ strategies. In contrast to the candidate equilibrium in proposition 1, the agency
at least subsidizes its preferred project type. For the ”desired” equilibrium – where the
agency only grants subsidies to projects with a high social return and a private return
that is too little to guarantee private investment – to exist, the very strict condition
(2.1) on the social return function and the amount of subsidy S in comparison to the
private investment P must hold. First, the subsidy must be larger than the private
investment. Second, the slope of IH must be large between P and S to oﬀset for the
agency’s investment S in the payoﬀ function. Even if this equilibrium exists, the socially
preferred projects then only receive public and no private funding.
In addition to the candidate equilibria considered so far, there is also the possibility
that the agency is making no diﬀerence between the type of project and thus revealing
no information on the riskiness of projects to banks.
Proposition 3.
a) There is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S if
a1) α · C + (1 − α) · D > 0,
a2) λ · A + (1 − λ) · B < 0, and
a3) −S + IL(S + P) > 0.
Banks beliefs in this equilibrium are µ = α and λ > B
B−A and they give loans to
subsidized projects and no loans to non subsidized projects.
b) There is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on nS if
b1) α · A + (1 − α) · B > 0,
b2) µ · C + (1 − µ) · D < 0, and
b3) −S + IH(S) < IH(P).
Banks’ beliefs in this equilibrium are λ = α and µ > D
D−C and they give loans to non
subsidized projects and no loans to subsidized projects.
8Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for the equilibrium pooling on S is the following. First, banks’ expected
proﬁts if a project is subsidized must be positive (a1). Otherwise, banks would not give
loans and there would be an incentive to deviate for low risk types. Second, beliefs λ oﬀ
the equilibrium path must be in a way that expected proﬁts for non subsidized projects
are negative (a2). Again, else there would be an incentive to deviate for low risk types
as the agency prefers low risk projects to be solely privately ﬁnanced instead of being
publicly and privately ﬁnanced. As only subsidized projects get loans, there is clearly
no incentive to deviate for high risk projects since subsidizing these projects is in the
interest of the agency anyway. Finally, the private investment has to be high enough
that the agency prefers the low risk projects to be both publicly and privately ﬁnanced
instead of not being ﬁnanced at all (a3).13
For the equilibrium pooling on nS, the intuition is similar. Expected proﬁts for non
subsidized projects must be positive (b1) or else there is an incentive to deviate for high
risk projects. Also, beliefs µ oﬀ the equilibrium path must be in a way that expected
proﬁts for subsidized projects are negative (b2). Otherwise there is again an incentive
to deviate for high risk projects. If these two conditions hold, there is no incentive
to deviate for low risk projects as deviating would only result in subsidizing the not
preferred project and reducing private investment. For this equilibrium to exist it is
again necessary that private investment is large enough. Otherwise the agency would
prefer to give subsidies to high risk projects even though that would lead to no private
investment for these projects (b3).
In this ﬁrst setup, the role of the agency is thus not very fulﬁlling. Only if a very strict
condition on the social return function and the amount of subsidy in comparison to the
private investment holds, there is a real impact of the agency’s strategy on the outcome
of the game. In the pooling equilibria the signal has no impact at all. In other words:
The mere fact that the agency is able to distinguish between basic and applied research
is useless for private investors, if the agency decides not to forward this information.
Thus, for the government agency to play an important role and to have a real (and
hopefully positive) impact on innovation investments, there must be another factor when
granting subsidies. One factor might be that the agency acts as a ﬁlter for low quality
projects. In the following section we add this property to the agencies signal.
2.2 Subsidies with Quality Signal
The game has the same structure as before, with the exception that only some R&D
projects qualify for subsidies. The idea is that only a proportion p of projects in both
risk classes met certain requirements of the agency, like the size of the R&D laboratory
13If we require beliefs to be justiﬁable in the sense of McLennan (1985), the belief λ as given in part
a) of proposition 3 is not possible and there is no equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S. The
proof is given as a remark on proposition 3 in the appendix.
9or a minimum number of researchers with a certain experience in the particular ﬁeld of
technology. Projects that fail these pre-screening quality requirements are automatically
rejected without any explicit decision from the agency. That is, the agency cannot grant
a subsidy to these projects even if it wanted to. These projects are of lower quality than
the other projects. As before, banks can neither distinguish between high and low risk
nor high and low quality projects. The information subset now contains four nodes with
beliefs λ1 to λ4.14 The changed game structure is shown in ﬁgure 2.
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Figure 2: Game Structure with Quality Signal.
We assume that banks’ expected payoﬀs for low quality projects are 2x lower than
expected payoﬀs for high quality projects. To assure comparability of the two setups, ex
ante expected payoﬀs for banks remain unchanged. Banks’ expected proﬁt can be split
up in two groups for low and high quality projects:
Y = (˜ Y + x) · p + (˜ Y − x) · (1 − p)
14Theoretically, we could also include nodes in the game tree for low quality projects which receive
subsidies. However, these nodes cannot be reached as low quality projects cannot receive subsidies.
Therefore these nodes are omitted.
10where Y ∈ {A,B,C,D}. However, depending on the agency’s subsidizing strategy banks
can update their beliefs and recalculate expected payoﬀs.
If a project is not subsidized, there are now two possibilities. Either the agency choose
not to, or the project did not even qualify to apply for subsidies and is therefore of lower
quality. If a project is subsidized on the other hand, banks can be sure it is high quality
type. This changes the variety of possible equilibria.
Proposition 4. There is no separating equilibrium where subsidies are granted for low
risk projects and no subsidies are granted for high risk projects.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for the non-existence of this type of equilibrium is the same as in the
previous setup. Subsidizing clearly indicates low risk projects to banks and hence loans
are given to this type of projects. Therefore, the agency has an incentive to deviate for
high risk projects.
However, the new property of subsidizing, i.e., the included quality signal, makes
conditions for the agency’s preferred equilibrium less restrictive.
Proposition 5. There is a separating equilibrium where subsidies are granted for high
risk projects and no subsidies are granted for low risk projects if
a) ˜ C + x > 0, λ2 ·









˜ B + x

> 0, i.e., loans are given to
both types of projects, or
b) ˜ C + x < 0 and λ2 ·









˜ B + x

< 0, i.e., no loans are
given to both types of projects, or
c) ˜ C +x > 0, λ2 ·









˜ B + x

< 0 and −S +IL(S +P) < 0,
i.e., loans are given to high risk projects only and the agency prefers low risk projects
rather to be not ﬁnanced than to be ﬁnanced both privately and publicly, or
d) ˜ C +x < 0, λ2·









˜ B + x

> 0 and IH(P) < −S +IH(S),
i.e., the same condition as in the previous setup: Only low risk projects are privately
ﬁnanced and the agency prefers a solely publicly ﬁnanced to a solely privately ﬁnanced
high risk project.
In all cases, banks’ beliefs are λ1 = 0, λ2 = (1−p)· α
1−α·p, λ3 = (1−p)· 1−α
1−α·p, λ4 = p· 1−α
1−α·p,
and µ = 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
If a subsidy is a real signal for quality, chances that the agency’s (and thus, society’s)
preferred equilibrium exists are increased. For banks it is important to adjust their
beliefs λi if no subsidy is observed, because although we are considering a separating
equilibrium, there are still three possibilities for the project type. There are high risk
11projects that did not qualify for subsidies (λ2) and low risk projects which are either of
low quality and therefore not subsidized (λ3) or of high quality and the agency chooses
not to subsidize (λ4). Banks’ belief λ2 for example must therefore be calculated as the
conditional probability of a high risk project, given that the project is not subsidized.
Compared to the ex ante situation, the expected payoﬀ is modiﬁed in two ways. First,
the expected payoﬀ for high risk projects is decreased as all high risk projects are now
of low quality. Second, the proportion of low risk type projects – the ones banks prefer
– is increased. Therefore, it is not clear whether loans to non subsidized projects in the
changed situation are more likely. With beliefs λi and µ banks calculate expected payoﬀs
and decide to give loans or not. Given these decisions, it is intuitive that the agency has
no incentive to deviate in cases a) and b). Either both types of project or no type of
project are privately funded and the agency thus only chooses to subsidize the projects it
prefers, i.e., the high risk type projects. In case c) the quality restriction makes high risk,
high quality projects proﬁtable for private investors. On the other hand, the negative
eﬀect of low quality projects is high such that private investors do not want to ﬁnance
projects that did not meet the agency’s quality restriction. An additional condition
on the agency’s payoﬀ has to hold such that there is no incentive to deviate for low
risk projects from the candidate equilibrium. Case d) is equivalent to the condition in
proposition 2 in the previous setup.
The extended setup, with pre-screening quality restrictions, also changes conditions
for the pooling equilibria. This is particularly striking for the equilibrium where the
agency is pooling on S. Due to the automatically rejected projects the non subsidy
information set is still reached on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 6.
a) There is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S if
(a1) α ·

˜ C + x

+ (1 − α)






˜ A − x

+ (1 − α)

˜ B − x

< 0, and
(a3) −S + IL(S + P) > 0.
Banks’ beliefs in this equilibrium are λ1 = λ4 = 0, λ2 = α, λ3 = 1 − α, µ = α and
they give loans to subsidized projects and no loans to non subsidized projects.
b) There is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on nS if
(b1) α · A + (1 − α) · B > 0,
(b2) µ ·

˜ C + x

+ (1 − µ)

˜ D + x

< 0, and
(b3) −S + IH(S) < IH(P).
Banks’ beliefs in this equilibrium are λ1 = p·α, λ2 = (1−p)·α, λ3 = (1−p)·(1−α),
λ4 = p · (1 − α), and µ > D
D−C and they give loans to non subsidized projects and no
loans to subsidized projects.
Proof. See the appendix.
12Comparing requirements for equilibria in proposition 3 and 6, we see that the condi-
tions for the equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S get less strict while they get
more restrictive for the nS pooling equilibrium. Consider ﬁrst the equilibrium where the
agency grants subsidies to both types of projects. The ﬁrst condition requires the ex-
pected proﬁt for the combination of subsidized high and low risk projects to be positive.
In proposition 6, however, this expected proﬁt only includes high quality projects. The
condition is therefore less restrictive. The problem with the second condition is that in
proposition 3 beliefs λ can be chosen as high as needed that the condition holds while in
proposition 6 λ2 = α is required because the information set is reached in equilibrium.15
The argumentation is therefore only true for λ = α. In this case the second condition
requires that expected proﬁts for the combination of non subsidized high and low risk
projects is negative. As in proposition 6 only the low quality projects are included, this
condition is less restrictive.16
The opposite is true for the equilibrium where the agency is giving no subsidies to any
project. The ﬁrst and the last condition is the same in both cases. The second condition,
however, is more restrictive in proposition 6 as banks know that subsidized projects are
of high quality. Therefore, the condition that the expected proﬁt of the combination of
high and low risk projects is negative is less likely to hold.17
3 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of a government subsidy as a signal to private investors.
In our simpliﬁed framework it is assumed that ﬁrms apply for subsidies for any type of
project. In the model’s ﬁrst setup, there are projects of two risk types: High risk projects
with little private but high social returns, preferred by the agency and low risk projects
with high private but little social returns, preferred by private investors. A government
agency screens projects and observes their types. Then the agency decides on granting
a subsidy. Banks only observe the agency’s decision but not the project type and give
loans to projects or not.
In the ﬁrst formulation, the agency’s subsidy gives no quality signal. We show that
in this setup an equilibrium where the agency is pooling its strategy for both risk types
either on S or on nS is very likely. For an equilibrium where the agency is only subsidizing
those projects where private returns are not suﬃcient, a very strict condition on the social
return function and the amount of private and public investment must hold.
This changes if there is a pre-screening quality requirement for subsidies. In this
setup only a certain proportion of projects meet the agency’s quality standard. Only for
15Since λ1 = λ4 = 0, λ2 has to be compared with λ and λ3 with 1 − λ.
16Another indicator that conditions for the pooling equilibrium on S get less restrictive is that beliefs
in proposition 3 are not justiﬁable.
17In this case, beliefs µ can be chosen freely for both conditions. However, with the same beliefs the
condition in proposition 6 is less likely to hold. Furthermore, if ˜ C + x > 0, there are no beliefs for this
condition to hold as ˜ D + x > 0.
13these projects the agency is deciding on granting subsidies. It is shown that the agency
can now eﬀectively diﬀerentiate between project types and thus fulﬁll its role of being a
sponsor for projects that are socially desirable. Conditions for this separating equilibrium
are likely to hold. Thus, for the signal to be socially beneﬁcial, it is important that it
also reveals quality information on projects.
Lerner’s (1999) study generally shows the positive impact of a signaling eﬀect of the
subsidy. In the light of our results it would be interesting to redo a similar study that
explicitly controls for the contained quality information in the signal.
Our model has several simplifying assumptions. We totally abstract from ﬁrms’ de-
cisions. This is done because ﬁrms have an incentive to apply for subsidies for any type
of project in the short run. In the long run, however, ﬁrms could adapt their research
strategies, depending on agency’s and banks’ behavior. This would then in turn inﬂuence
conditions for equilibria.
Projects are restricted to be of two diﬀerent types and we assume perfect screening
by the agency and no screening by banks. A setup where projects diﬀer gradually and
agency’s screening is just superior to banks’ screening would be more realistic, yet not
analytically tractable.
Finally, we abstract from other information or observation problems. While it would
be interesting to study moral hazard for ﬁrms’ utilization of investment, this paper
restricts attention to the asymmetric information problem, which is deﬁnitely of impor-
tance for investors in uncertain R&D projects.
Our model conﬁrms the empirical observations of Lerner (1999), Feldman and Kelley
(2006), and Meuleman and de Maeseneire (2008): Subsidies can have a signaling char-
acter if a government agency is better informed about projects than private investors.
However, as we have shown in the second setup, it is crucial that the signal reveals
quality information about projects to private investors.
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Proof of Proposition 1. If there was such an equilibrium, banks beliefs must be λ = 1
and µ = 0. Therefore, banks decide to give no loan if they observe no subsidy for a
project (since A < 0) and give loans if a subsidy is observed (since D > 0). That gives
the agency an incentive to deviate if a project is of high risk type, because the payoﬀ
when deviating to grant a subsidy (−S + IH(S + P) > 0) is higher than the agency’s
payoﬀ when sticking to the no subsidy strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the candidate equilibrium, banks beliefs must be λ = 0 and
µ = 1. Therefore banks decide to give no loan if a subsidy is observed (since C < 0)
and give loans if a subsidy is observed (since B > 0). The agency has no incentive to
deviate for low risk types as IL(P) > −S + IL(S). For high risk types, agency’s payoﬀ
is −S + IH(S). If the agency deviates and gives no subsidy to high risk types its payoﬀ
changes to IH(P). Thus, there is no incentive to deviate if −S + IH(S) > IH(P).
Proof of Proposition 3. a) If the agency decides on subsidizing both types of project,
banks’ belief µ = α. Therefore, banks decide to give loans when a subsidy is
observed if
αC + (1 − α)D > 0. (4.1)
Oﬀ the equilibrium path, banks give loans if
λA + (1 − λ)B > 0. (4.2)
If both (4.1) and (4.2) hold, there is an incentive to deviate for low risk types since
−S + IL(S + P) < IL(P).
If (4.1) holds and (4.2) does not hold, there is an incentive to deviate for low risk
types if −S + IL(S + P) < 0. There is no incentive to deviate for high risk types
since −S + IH(S + P) > 0.
If (4.1) does not hold there is an incentive to deviate for low risk types since
−S + IL(S) < min{IL(P),0} = 0.
Thus, there is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S if
αC + (1 − α)D > 0, λA + (1 − λ)B < 0 and −S + IL(S + P) > 0. In this
equilibrium the agency always grants a subsidy, banks give no loans if no subsidy
is observed and give loans if a subsidy is observed. Banks’ beliefs are µ = α and
λ > B
B−A.18
b) If the agency decides on subsidizing neither type of project banks’ belief λ = α.
Therefore, banks decide to give loans when no subsidy is observed if
αA + (1 − α)B > 0. (4.3)
18The boundary for belief λ is derived from (4.2) not holding.
15Oﬀ the equilibrium path, banks give loans if
µC + (1 − µ)D > 0. (4.4)
If (4.3) holds and (4.4) does not hold, there is no incentive to deviate for low risk
types since IL(P) > −S + IL(S), and no incentive to deviate for high risk types if
−S + IH(S) < IH(P).
If (4.3) and (4.4) hold, there is an incentive to deviate for high risk types since
IH(P) < −S + IH(S + P).
If (4.3) does not hold, there is an incentive to deviate for high risk types since
0 < min{−S + IH(S),−S + IH(S + P)} = −S + IH(S).
Thus, there is no incentive to deviate from the candidate equilibrium if (4.3) holds,
(4.4) does not hold and −S+IH(S) < IH(P). Beliefs in this equilibrium are λ = α
and µ > D
D−C.19
Remark on proposition 3 a):
Beliefs λ are not justiﬁable for the following reason: The agency would never deviate
for high risk types (no matter what strategy the banks are using when no subsidy is
observed) because −S + IH(S + P) > max{0,IH(P)}. For low risk types the deviation
would make sense, if a deviation induces banks to give a loan. Hence, banks could infer
from agency’s payoﬀs that a deviation from the candidate equilibrium would only make
sense if the project is of low risk type. Therefore, banks have to assign zero probability
to the node belonging to high risk types, i.e., λ = 0. If the belief is λ = 0, banks would
indeed give loans if no subsidy is observed as B > 0. In this case, the agency has an
incentive to deviate for low risk types. Thus, there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with justiﬁable beliefs where the agency is pooling on S.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof works in a similar way as in the ﬁrst setup. If a subsidy
is observed, banks’ belief is still µ = 0. Therefore, banks decide to give a loan if a
subsidy is observed ( ˜ D + x > 0). However, banks can no longer be sure of the project
type if there is no subsidy observed, because it is also possible, that the project did
not even qualify for subsidies. So banks have to calculate conditional probabilities for
their beliefs λi. However, no matter if banks decide to give a loan when no subsidy
is observed or not, there is always an incentive to deviate for high risk projects since
−S + IH(S + P) > max{IH(P),0} = IH(P).
19The boundary for belief µ is derived from (4.4) not holding.
16Proof of Proposition 5. In the proposed equilibrium the agency grants a subsidy for all
high risk projects that qualify and grants no subsidy for low risk projects. Thus, if no
subsidy is observed, a project is either low risk type, or high risk type and low quality.
Banks can therefore update beliefs λi. Belief λ1 = 0 since high risk projects of high
quality receive a subsidy. The probability that a project is non subsidized is
prob (non subsidized) = (1 − p) · α
| {z }
prob (high risk ∧ low quality)





λ2 = prob (high risk|non subsidized) =
(1 − p) · α
(1 − p) · α + (1 − α)
=
(1 − p) · α
1 − α · p
,
and
λ3 + λ4 = prob (low risk|non subsidized) = 1 − λ2 =
1 − α
1 − α · p
.
The ratio λ3
λ4 must equal the ratio of low quality to high quality projects
1−p
p . Therefore
λ3 = (1 − p) ·
1 − α
1 − α · p
,
λ4 = p ·
1 − α
1 − α · p
.
If a subsidy is observed, banks can be sure that the project is of high risk type, thus
µ = 1. Banks will therefore decide to give a loan when no subsidy is observed if
λ2 ·









˜ B + x

> 0, (4.5)
and give a loan when a subsidy is observed if
˜ C + x > 0. (4.6)
a) If both equations hold, the agency has no incentive to deviate for high risk types
since
−S + IH(S) > IH(P),
and no incentive to deviate for low risk types since
IL(P) > −S + IL(S + P).
b) If both equations do not hold, the agency has no incentive to deviate since for the
high risk types the payoﬀ is
−S + IH(S) > 0,
and for the low risk types the payoﬀ is
0 > −S + IL(S).
17c) If (4.5) does not hold and (4.6) holds, the agency’s payoﬀ is 0 for low risk type projects
and it therefore has no incentive to deviate if −S +IL(S +P) < 0. For high risk type
projects the agency never has an incentive to deviate since −S + IH(S + P) > 0.
d) If (4.6) does not hold and (4.5) holds, the agency’s payoﬀ for high risk projects is
−S + IH(S) and it has no incentive to deviate for high risk projects if IH(P) <
−S + IH(S). For low risk type projects the agency never has an incentive to deviate
since IL(P) > −S + IL(S).
Thus, if one of the four conditions holds, there is an equilibrium where high risk projects
are subsidized and low risk projects are not.
Proof of Proposition 6. a) If the agency is always granting a subsidy, it is still possible
to be in the no subsidy information set in equilibrium because of the automatically
rejected projects. Therefore, banks are not free to choose their beliefs λi. The nodes
belonging to λ1 and λ4 are not reached in equilibrium, therefore λ1 = λ4 = 0. Nodes
belonging to λ2 and λ3 are reached in equilibrium with a priori probabilities for high
and low risk projects. Thus, λ2 = α, λ3 = 1 − α. If a subsidy is granted, the belief is
calculated as µ =
pα
p = α. The rest of the proof works similar to the previous pooling
equilibrium. Banks decide to give loans when a subsidy is observed if
α ·

˜ C + x

+ (1 − α)

˜ D + x

> 0, (4.7)
and when no subsidy is observed if
α ·

˜ A − x

+ (1 − α)

˜ B − x

> 0. (4.8)
If (4.7) holds, there is no incentive to deviate for the high risk types since −S +
IH(S + P) > max{IH(P),0} = IH(P).
If (4.7) and (4.8) hold, there is an incentive to deviate for the low risk types since
−S + IL(S + P) < IL(P).
If (4.7) holds and (4.8) does not hold, there is an incentive to deviate for low risk
types if −S + IL(S + P) < 0. There is no incentive to deviate for the high risk types
since −S + IH(S + P) > 0}.
If (4.7) does not hold, there is an incentive to deviate for the low risk types since
−S + IL(S) < min{IL(P),0} = 0.
Thus, there is an equilibrium where the agency is pooling on S if α ·














˜ B − x

< 0 and −S +IL(S +P) > 0. In this
equilibrium the agency always grants a subsidy, banks give no loans if no subsidy is
observed and give loans if a subsidy is observed. Banks’ beliefs are λ = µ = α.
b) This proof exactly works as the proof for proposition 3 b). As banks cannot diﬀeren-
tiate between low and high quality projects, the situation if no subsidy is observed
18is the same. For the argumentation oﬀ the equilibrium path, i.e., when a subsidy is
observed, only banks’ payoﬀs have to be adjusted.
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